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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1952 MAY 16 AM 11 13

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR S/P

TO: EUR - Mr. Perkins
Mr. Bontriger

FROM: DMA - Andrew B. Foster

SUBJECT: Report of the State-Defense Working Group on the Middle East Command.

THE PROBLEM

EUR clearance for the Report.

BACKGROUND

You will recall that a State-Defense Working Group has been engaged since February 19 on the preparation of a paper setting forth the recommended position to be taken by the U.S. representatives at the forthcoming seven-power meeting (U.S., U.K., France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) to be held during the next month or two, probably in London, in connection with the proposed establishment of the Middle East Command. The Working Group, chairmanned by Mr. Lewis Jones of NEA, has included Messrs. Nolting of G, Stabler, Dorss, and Despit of NEA, Spalding of RA, Vigderman of L/E, Foster of DMA, and Captains Loud and Patrick (USN) of the Gold Team of Defense.

The Working Group completed its labors on April 9 and has embodied its recommendations in the attached report, which is now being sent up the line in State and Defense. In State it is to be cleared through NEA, EUR, G, S/P (Mr. Nitze), S/A (Mr. Jessup), G, L, H, and the Under Secretary to the Secretary. In Defense it is to be sent up from the Gold Team through the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary.

It should be noted in connection with Defense clearance that the representatives of the Gold Team have made it clear that they have not been in a position to speak for the Joint Chiefs or the Defense Department and cannot promise clearance by either. On our side, I have informed the Group that I could not say whether you would approve the report. Mr. Nolting is apparently satisfied with

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State-Defense Report

Paul
I think you will be interested in this memo. Andy Foster on the MEC
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with the report and I gather he feels that Mr. Matthews approves the general line it follows. I understand that Mr. Ferguson of S/P and Mr. Jessup of S/A read an earlier draft and were generally satisfied with it. Mr. Eyroade has read the present draft but I do not know whether he has approved it.

There has been no consultation with any of the other six governments to be represented at the conference - no consultation, that is to say, with regard to the agenda or the major problems which will be discussed. It is true that the other powers are known to support the MEC in principle, and as far as the British are concerned you may recall that they gave us in January and February some memoranda generally outlining the U.K. position. Mr. Jones has felt that it was desirable to establish the U.S. position before engaging in preliminary discussions with the other governments.

THE WORKING GROUP'S RECOMMENDATIONS

You will note that the Working Group's report recommends that the U.S. should be represented at the conference by State and Defense officers of the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The Working Group is of the opinion that the U.S. representatives should be given as much leeway as possible, particularly since we do not know what the attitudes of the other six governments are going to be in regard to many of the subjects for discussion. The U.S. representatives would, in any case, be empowered to agree only ad referendum.

The Working Group's philosophy is epitomized in the statement (under "Facts and Assumptions", section II 2(a)) that

> "The United States supports the establishment of a Middle East Command Organization in the belief that such an organization may make an early contribution to the political stabilization of the vitally important Middle East area, and in the long run increase the capacity of the area to resist Soviet aggression."

In brief, the Working Group recommends that the MEC should be established as soon as possible, probably with headquarters on Cyprus; that the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East, probably a Britisher, should be appointed; that there should be some kind of authority for the direction of SACME (perhaps a Military Committee or a Standing Group), though it is recognized that

conditions

conditions in the Middle East preclude the possibility of establishing a higher political direction on the NATO model; that SACME should devote himself to "planning, coordinating and liaison"; and that liaison between SACME and the interested Arab states should be maintained by a Middle East Defense Liaison Organization (MEDLO).

"United States participation in the Command will be limited to participation in the integrated Command staff and the provision of some military aid to certain states in the Middle East area. No commitment of United States forces to the defense of the Middle East is contemplated" (II 5(a)).

The Working Group recognizes that in its initial stage the Middle East Command will not be a Command and that SACME will not command anything. It discussed the possibility of changing the name to conform to the realities. "Middle East Defense Planning Board" or "Middle East Defense Organization" were suggested, but the feeling was that there would be difficulty in changing the name at this stage and "the name is valued by the British by reason of tradition and prestige" (V 1).

HAMLET WITHOUT THE HAMLET

There is one fundamental aspect of the problem which is touched on only in passing in the Working Group's paper but which has had a profound influence on its reasoning and recommendations. This is the fact that Turkey is now in NATO and the assumption, flowing from that fact, that the Middle East Command will have neither any responsibility for the defense of Turkey nor the support of any Turkish forces (except six divisions which it is said Turkey might consider contributing if the U.S. would pay for them).

A further assumption accepted by a majority of the [illegible] Group is that the Turks feel such resentment and antip[illegible]d the British, chiefly because of British opposition t[illegible] joining NATO, that they will not cooperate with a B[illegible] East Commander.

THE ARAB REACTION

There is another fundamental aspect of the prob[illegible]ch is not discussed in the Working Group's paper. This is the possibility, mentioned in reports from our embassies in the Middle East and in various intelligence appreciations, that the Arab peoples will not welcome the establishment of the MEC but may regard it as the [illegible]le of Western imperialism, Turkish power politics, British special

special interests, et cetera. The Working Group is reconciled to the strong improbability of Egyptian participation in MEC but it assumes that at least some of the other Arab states will come in on an "associate membership" basis.

SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

1. Two Birds with One Stone?

There would seem to be, from the point of view of the U.S. in particular and the West in general, two separate though related problems in the Middle East. The first in urgency and importance is surely the military defense of the area against possible Soviet attack through the Caucasus and across the Straits. Regardless whether the U.S. participates actively in the military defense of the region (and now that Turkey is in NATO we are bound, even more than we were under the Truman Doctrine, to render her such assistance as we can), it is my understanding that we agree with the British in considering it vital to the West that efforts should be made to hold the Middle East.

The second problem in the Middle East is the political one. It is compounded of rising Arab nationalism, the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, the Israeli-Arab conflict, Mosadeq, the preoccupation of Pakistan with Kashmir, the declining prestige of the U.K., France, and the U.S. in the area, and plenty of other things. This is the long-term problem which it will obviously take generations to solve.

Can any single stone be found that will kill these two birds?

2. Does the Proposed MEC Face Up to the Military Problem?

If it is the military objective to defend the Middle East against Soviet attack, the first point for determination is what effective forces are available? The answer is, of course, the Turkish army, certain British ground forces and air squadrons, and certain Commonwealth forces committed to the area in case of war. From the military standpoint it would seem to be the essence of the problem to devise the means to coordinate Turkish and British resources and plans. The proposed MEC, however, is founded on the assumption, as noted above, that such coordination in any real sense is politically impossible.

3. Will the Proposed MEC Strengthen the British Position in the Middle East?

Inasmuch

as SACME will not command anything

(except

4

(except perhaps some British forces at a later stage),

as SACME's defense preparations will have to be made in relative isolation from the Turks,

as SACME's terms of reference will put him squarely in the center of the major politi[illegible] problems of the area, and

as the U.S. will neither contribute forces to his command nor undertake any commitment to defend the area,

the question may be asked whether the proposed MEC is in line with the declared U.S. policy of supporting the British position in the Middle East.

The Working Group took the view that the British are reconciled to this dismal situation and will be glad enough to have the MEC established and the position of SACME given to a Britisher even though he will have little or no support from anyone except the Commonwealth. It might be argued that Mr. Churchill's statement to Congress in January that he would welcome the presence of U.S. token forces in the Canal Zone was not only out of step with modern times but tactless besides. Be this as it may, the question remains whether it is in the U.S. interest to accept a situation to which the British, lacking our support, have no recourse but to reconcile themselves.

4. Can Such a Military Organization Accomplish the Desired Political Objectives in the Middle East?

This is the reverse of the military-political coin. If it may be doubted that a "political" MEC will be able to take effective steps toward the military defense of the area against possible Soviet aggression, it may also be doubted whether an organization bearing the name "Command" and sponsored by six states not indigenous to the area (plus one Middle Eastern state that has joined NATO) will succeed in gaining the confidence and support of the Arab peoples.

5. Should the MEC Concept be Re-appraised?

During the six months since the MEC was rejected by the Egyptians (October 1951) and since the Paris Declaration (November 1951) there

have

have been certain developments which perhaps call for a re-appraisal from both the military and political viewpoints. These developments include the accession of Turkey to NATO, the Anglo-Egyptain dispute, growing Arab unrest in French North Africa, and the worsening of the Iranian situation.

6. Would a Seven-power Conference in the Near Future Serve a Useful Purpose?

Until the political and military objectives of the U.S. in the Middle East are more clearly defined and widely agreed, and until we have a better idea of what the other interested governments, especially the British, expect of the MEC, the question is whether a seven-power conference could achieve the results evidently expected of it. True, the conference is intended to be "preliminary" and is to try to avoid publicity. If, however, it fails to reach agreement (even on an ad referendum basis) or if it arouses fundamental differences, the news is bound to leak and the MEC enterprise will benefit least of all among the Arabs at which it is aimed.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Lewis Jones argues, with the support of the majority of the members of the Working Group, that the recommendations in the attached paper are in conformity with U.S. policy toward the Middle East as determined by the highest levels in the Government; further, that the situation in the area dictates this as the best approach to the problem. I have felt bound, however, to put the foregoing questions before you. They really boil down to one question: What is the U.S. stake in the Middle East and is the kind of MEC proposed by the Working Group the best way to defend it?

Attachment.

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TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1952 MAY 16 AM 11 15
OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
S/P

RECOMMENDED UNITED STATES POLICY

IN REGARD TO

ESTABLISHMENT OF MIDDLE EAST COMMAND ORGANIZATION

1918

Report of State-Defense Working Group

TOP SECRET

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

It is hoped that those reviewing the position recommended in Parts III and IV of the attached paper will bear in mind certain of the points made in Part V of the attachment. This part contains the conclusion that adequate legal authority exists for the participation of the United States in the MEDO, as proposed, but suggests that the Administration will probably wish to discuss a step of such importance with Congress. The manner and timing of an approach to the Arab States is also discussed. The position recommended may be more readily understood if in addition to the points mentioned above, the following considerations are also borne in mind.

1. Dual Objectives of MEDO. The MEDO has both military and political objectives; and although these objectives are for the most part consistent they imply somewhat different criteria of judgment. Expedients calculated to serve the one are not always ideally adapted to serve the other. The MEDO should make an early improvement in the coordination of the military forces available for the defense of the area. So far as the indigenous military strength of the area is concerned, it is not expected that this will be appreciably increased within the next several years. It is hoped, however, that the MEDO in its initial phase will contribute to stability in the Middle East and will provide a vehicle, now notably lacking, for cooperation between the Middle East states and the Western Powers.

2. Lack of Political Base. There is no community of objectives and institutions which could be made the basis for a political treaty uniting the Middle East States and the Western Powers. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the United States would be willing to enter into treaty arrangements with the Middle Eastern states. Under these circumstances, it has been necessary to attempt to erect a military structure without a political foundation. If the organization can be made to work successfully, it may help eventually to create conditions in which a substantial political foundation is possible.

3. Flexibility. Given the conditions described in 1 and 2 above the MEDO must necessarily remain for a period in process of evolution. As the Four-Power Declaration of November 20, 1951, (Paragraph 11), states:

> "The sponsoring states of the Middle East Command do not regard the initial form in which the Middle East Command will be organized as unchangeable; they believe that the Middle East Command through mutual understanding should evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense of the Middle East area as a whole."

4. Initial Structure of Organization. As initially established, the

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MEDO will not in fact be a Command at all -- but rather a planning and liaison organization, with certain advisory functions in the field of training and equipment of the forces in the area. This initial form has been dictated by two facts: a) Turkey's accession to NATO, with the result that [illegible] forces presently available for assignment to MEDO are British, and b) the continuing impasse in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute concerning the Canal base. So long as these conditions obtain, it will hardly be possible to establish an effective operational Command. The British have urged, however, and we have expressed agreement, that considerable benefits might flow from the establishment of an organization even with functions as limited as those described above. Until SACME becomes a Commander in fact, the British have proposed that he should be given the title of SACME Designate and Chairman of MEDO. It is in the United States interest that SACME should become a Commander in fact as soon as possible, and we should endeavor to assist this development. In the meantime, we can reasonably expect important psychological and political benefits from an organization even of the limited character proposed in the attached draft.

5. Relationship with NATO. Another aspect of the proposed organization which it has not been possible to define exactly is its relationship to NATO. The United States in discussions of this problem with the United Kingdom and France has insisted that the matter can be worked out only after the MEDO is established and its character and operations known; and has emphasized that any arrangements for the coordination of the MEC with contiguous NATO commands must be subject to the approval of NAC. The Working Group considered that although in setting up the MEDO it was desirable to make sure that the arrangements in MEDO would facilitate such coordination, it was not desirable at this stage to attempt to do more than this.

6. Composition of ME Steering Group. Related to 5 is the composition of the Middle East Steering Group. This was the most difficult problem the Working Group encountered. There is a foundamental conflict in the military and political desiderata which such a Group should meet, and no fully satisfactory resolution of the conflict was found. On grounds of military efficiency it was urged that the Group should not exceed three members; furthermore, it was felt that any arrangements which violated this principle might affect not only MEDO, but NATO as well, where there has been a sustained effort by the other powers to increase the three-power Standing Group. On political grounds, however, it was considered necessary to include at least four powers on the ME Steering Group:

a) The United Kingdom, because it would provide the bulk of the troops, in the foreseeable future, the Supreme Commander, and the logistic support for Headquarters.

b) The United States, because our inclusion is necessary to give the enterprise the broader and non-colonial aspect which is essential to its saleability in the Middle East.

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a) Turkey, because it has the most substantial military force in the area; because one of the most important tasks in planning the defense of the ME will be the coordination of Turkish war plans with those of British Middle East Forces; and finally, because without Turkey, the Steering Group would be an exclusively Western body, which would appear to be imposing Western dominance on the Middle East.

d) France, because even though its presence on the ME Steering Group will represent a liability in most countries of the Middle East, it probably must be included for general political reasons.

These considerations led logically in the direction of a 4-Power Steering Group composed of United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey or a Three Power group (not recommended by State on political grounds) upon which at least the membership of one power would rotate annually (e.g., initially either France or Turkey would be on the ME Steering Group but not both). This question was further complicated by the fact that if Egypt should elect to participate in MEDO, it, too, would be likely to insist upon most favored nation treatment and this would call for the possible enlargement of the Steering Group, or at least enlargement of the number of states eligible for the third place on the Steering Group.

This problem is likely to be the subject of lively debate in the Seven-Power meeting. One possible solution would be to set up MEDO without a Steering Group. Later a Steering Group could be established following receipt of the recommendations of the Chairman of MEDO to this effect based on his experience of operations initially in the planning and training fields without a Steering Group. The Working Group believes that United States objectives will probably be met by a Steering Group of any composition which will(a) be efficient from the point of view of the Chairman of MEDO, and (b) develop maximum coopera-tion in the MEDO enterprise from Turkey and Middle East states.

7. Enlistment of Arab Support. This problem involves questions of procedure as well as of substance. The questions of procedure -- the manner and timing of approaches to the Arab States -- are considered in Part V, Section 5 of the attachment. The question of substance relates primarily to the character of participation in MEDO which the Arab States are most likely to find acceptable.

The basic difficulty is that while on the one hand the Arab States are likely to be unwilling to accept any substantial obligations in the MEDO, they will on the other hand be resentful if they are treated differently from those states which do accept obligations. The area where differentiation in treatment seems unavoidable is in the constitution of the higher authority (Military Committee of Chiefs of Staff) and the organization of the integrated command staff. It does not appear desirable to include in these bodies representatives of those Middle East states which merely passively associate themselves with MEDO and

make no contribution to the organization.

One possibility, not considered in the report, would be so far as possible to eliminate the distinction which would make all Arab states second class citizens, at least at the outset. This might be done by equating the provision by ME states of bases to any of the sponsoring powers with a contribution to MEDO, particularly if they were willing to extend to SACME the right to use these bases in time of war. States which provide such base rights might be treated as full members of MEDO entitled to representation on the Higher Authority and to provide officers to the integrated staff. This would have the effect of qualifying Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and possibly Egypt, and of the Arab States would leave only Syria, Lebanon and Yemen to work their way in.

The Working Group, for the purpose of the report, saw no alternative to defining membership as on pages 3,4. It recognized, however, that this question probably will be discussed at length in the course of the Seven Power meeting from which it is hoped a satisfactory formula regarding the categories of membership will emerge. The United States should be prepared to accept any formula which will produce the maximum cooperation from the states of the Middle East.

d. Position of Israel. Closely related to ? is the question of the position of Israel in any regional defense arrangements. This is a matter which must be treated with great circumspection. In the initial phases of the MEDO, out of regard for Arab susceptibilities, it will be desirable to avoid all appearance of contact between the MEDO and Israel; at the same time it will be necessary to reassure Israel that the MEDO is not an extension of the Arab League, and that Israel's interests will not be jeopardized. With the passage of time it is hoped that it will be possible to bring Israel into closer relations with the MEDO and its Arab members, and that Israel will make a significant contribution to the defense of the ME. To effect these objectives, MEDO must have maximum flexibility in developing special arrangements with Israel.

[illegible]

[illegible] The [illegible] would be [illegible] Treaty to [illegible] [illegible] Standing Group [illegible] Council [illegible] Working Committee [illegible] Germany [illegible] [illegible] between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense [illegible] of December 20, 1950, January 25, 1951, The Secretary [illegible] with the Defense, [illegible] (a) and have the [illegible] [illegible] Standing Group [illegible] (b) [illegible] Atlantic Council, (c) prepare a [illegible] [illegible] would be a [illegible] [illegible] United States position to be [illegible] [illegible] Phases and Steps [illegible] (d) work out a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

II. FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Certain basic facts and assumptions underlie the recommendations of the Working Group. In part, these constitute a recognition of agreed elements in the present political and military situation in the Middle East; in part, they reflect the U.S. position as already officially approved (see Annex B). These facts and assumptions may be summarized as follows:

1. Establishment of a Middle East Command

a. It is desirable to establish the Middle East Command (MEC) and open its headquarters at an early date. Possible developments in the prospective headquarters area cannot affect the schedule of this operation.

b. In the assumption that it is politically feasible Headquarters MEC can be established in Egypt at the outset, due to the unsettled international dispute, the U.S. has suggested that the main headquarters be initially located on Cyprus.

2. [illegible]/Establishment of MEC

a. The United States supports the establishment of a Middle East Command Organization in the belief that such an organization may make an early contribution to the political stabilization of the vitally important Middle East area, and in the long run increase the capacity of the area to resist Soviet aggression.

b. In the absence of any foundation on which to erect a political structure such as the NATO, the MEC will not initially be based on any formal political arrangements. It is assumed that participation in the MEC will be based on the agreement of Governments, by terms of reference for a higher military authority within MEC, and for a Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East. (Annex)

c. In the initial phase, no forces will be assigned to MEC. The MEC will be a planning, coordinating and liaison organization. The same Middle East Command does not presently describe the character of the Organization as it will be initially established. (See Part V Paragraph 3)

f. The MEDO will consist of an integrated Allied Command Headquarters staff, a liaison organization on which all member states will be individually represented, and a higher military authority which will have general responsibility for guidance and direction of a military nature.

g. Any coordination of the MEC with contiguous NATO commands will be as mutually agreed to by members of the MEDO acting through the appropriate MEDO body and members of the NATO acting through the NAC, after MEDO has been established.

h. The coordination of arms shipments by the United States, United Kingdom and France to states of the Middle East area will initially be handled separately on a three-power basis. The manner in which this operation is coordinated with the defense plans of SACME will be decided later by the three powers concerned on the basis of experience.

3. Name

The proposed organization has been widely discussed as the Middle East Command, and the name is now fairly well fixed in the public mind. Moreover, it is assumed that the name is valued by the British for reasons of tradition and prestige. The British have suggested that during the initial phase, before the Command becomes operational, the organization should be called the Middle East Command Organization. Our Missions in the Middle East have indicated that a name such as the Middle East Defense Organization would have much greater appeal to the States of the area. It is also assumed that such a name would be more acceptable to the United States Congress.

4. Membership in MEDO

a. Membership in MEDO will be initially open to

i) the United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, all of which states have already agreed in principle to participate in MEDO, and

ii) the following Middle East States: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Israel, the Independent Arab Sheikdoms, and Iran.

b. Membership in MEDO will initially be of three types:

i) Sponsoring states: the states named in 4a i above.

(ii) Participating status would be as at 4 (a) (i) above which accept substantial obligations of membership, such as the agreement to British troops and make bases available to the MEDO.

(iii) Associated status would be as at 4 (a) (ii) above which is suitable mainly for countries with the Command, but which do not wish to assume the obligations involved in participation.

(c) As time goes, either before or after the establishment of MEDO, the distinction between sponsoring and participating states will probably disappear. Thereafter there will probably be only two types of membership (i) participating states i.e. former sponsors plus HE participating states (ii) as above) and (ii) associated states (b iii above).

5. United Kingdom

(a) United States participation in the Command will be limited to participation in the Integrated Command staff and the provision of some military aid to certain states in the Middle East area. No commitment of United States forces to the defence of the Middle East is contemplated.

(b) The United Kingdom now has about 60,000 troops in the Middle East and it is assumed that a portion of these troops will ultimately be assigned to the Command. The United Kingdom also has military treaty arrangements with Iraq and Jordan, as well as bases in Libya (Cyrenaica) and in Egypt and Cyprus. The United States has agreed that a British national should be designated SACME.

(c) South Africa has undertaken to supply an armored division and an air fighter group of nine squadrons for the defence of the African continent and the Middle East in the event of a Soviet attack.

(d) Australia recently decided to send two air squadrons, probably to Cyprus, to join the British peacetime Middle East garrison.

(e) New Zealand has committed itself to the United Kingdom to supply all its troops in the Middle East in the event of general war, and has agreed to dispatch a fighter squadron to the Middle East, probably next September.

B. Countries.

a. Turkey is now a member of NATO and all existing Turkish forces are regarded as NATO forces. The Turks have indicated a willingness, however, to raise six additional divisions for possible use in the defense of the Middle East. Turkey is also expected to provide officers for the Integrated Command staff.

b. Egypt's participation in MEDO will be limited to participation in the Integrated Command staff and the provision of some military aid to certain states in the Middle East area.

c. Egypt was invited in October 1951 to join the MEDO on a basis of equality with the U.K., U.S., France and Turkey. The invitation was, in effect, made conditional upon a satisfactory settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute concerning the British position of the Suez Canal Zone and was considered to be an element in such a settlement. It is now assumed that there is little likelihood that Egypt will choose in the foreseeable future to assume full responsibilities of participation in the Command, and that the possible role in the MEDO initially will not differ substantially from that of the other Arab States.

d. The other Arab States have refrained from taking any position with respect to MEDO. It is assumed that although it may be possible to include at least some of these states in the MEDO on an associate basis, they will be initially unwilling to accept any responsibilities within the Command. It is assumed that their willingness to cooperate and to accept responsibilities may be gradually developed. It is also assumed that the military strength of these states will in any event remain relatively insignificant for some time to come.

e. Israel, it is assumed, will individually associate itself with the Command in some special manner whenever such action proves to be possible without prejudicing the acceptability of the MEDO to the Arab states and without further exacerbating Arab-Israel relations. In the meantime, it will be necessary to handle MEDO-Israel contacts with great discretion.

f. Pakistan, has substantial interest in the Middle East and possesses considerable influence with certain states of that area. Pakistan has a large body of trained troops which could be expanded without too much difficulty and possesses the greatest military potential in the Middle East next to Turkey. Its accession to MEDO as a participating member would contribute significantly to the military and political strength of the Organization. Pakistan may wish to participate in the Command at some stage and this possibility should be kept under constant review.

i. Iran is isolated in the NEO area and will be eligible for membership in MEDO. It is assumed, however, that there is no possibility of Iran's accession to the MEDO within the foreseeable future.

6. Nature of the Command

a. The Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, (SACME) will be a British officer and will be responsible to a higher military authority. In the initial period, his title will be Chairman of MEDO and SACME Designate.

b. The area of Middle East Command responsibilities for planning purposes will include Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Israel, Cyprus, the independent Arab Sheikdoms, Iran and adjacent sea areas.

c. Officers of the integrated Allied Command Staff will initially be supplied by the sponsoring powers (NOTE: It is assumed that the contribution of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand is not likely to exceed two or three officers each). States electing to become participating members may be invited to assign officers to the staff of SACME.

d. Although no forces will be assigned to the MEDO in the initial phase, it should from the outset be organized in a manner which would permit early assumption of operational responsibilities in the event of war.

e. Total personnel requirements for the integrated Allied Command staff are estimated as probably not exceeding a total of about 75-100 officers and about 100 enlisted men for clerical and communications duties. In addition, an adequate security guard probably will be needed.

7. The Liaison Organization

a. The associated states of the Middle East area will maintain liaison with SACME through the Middle East Defense Liaison Organization (MEDLO) in which all member states (i.e., sponsoring, participating and associated states) will be represented.

b. MEDLO will be the center through which the states represented upon it will seek advice on training and arms assistance from the powers in a position to supply such assistance.

c. MEDLO will have an important part in promoting good will for MEDO and its objectives in the Middle East area.

XII. SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDO

1. There should be convened at an early date to be agreed through diplomatic channels a meeting of the 7 sponsoring powers of MEDO to establish the basis for initiating the MEDO. This meeting should reach agreement, ad referendum, on:

a) Location of MEDO headquarters.

b) Establishment of an Authority for Higher Direction of SACME.

c) The nationality c. SACME.

d) A date for a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the sponsoring powers at the Headquarters site, at which time SACME Designate would be appointed.

There should also be an exchange of views and, to the extent possible, agreement on:

a) Whether SACME's need for guidance and information will require the immediate establishment of a continuing sub-committee of the Authority for Higher Directing and if so, the composition and terms of reference of such a body.

b) The general character of Staff Organization, Headquarters, MEC, and the various national contributions thereto.

c) Terms of reference for SACME.

d) The nature and functions of MEDO.

2. The meeting which should be designated "preliminary" and avoid publicity should take place in London under a British Chairman. The United States should be represented by political and military officials, the ranking member of the United States group to be a civilian, unless it should develop that the majority of other delegations are to be led by military officers. The senior political officer should be of the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the senior military officer of the level of Open ans Deputy.

3. Depending on progress made at London, and on a decision as to the desirability of bringing in the Arab states at a preliminary stage, it may be desirable to hold a second "preliminary" meeting to put proposals in final shape for submission to Governments. [See P. 7, Section 5]

III. cont'd. - 6 -

4. Following consideration by Governments of the recommendations of the preliminary meeting there should be convened a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the sponsoring powers which would:

a) Approve the terms of reference of the Authority for Higher Direction, any required sub-committee thereof and for SACME.

b) Formally announce the establishment of the MEO and appointment of the Chairman, MEO and SACME Designate.

c) In consultation with SACME, approve the preliminary Staff Organization, Headquarters, MEO.

5. This action should be followed immediately by action on the part of the sponsoring powers, in assigning personnel to the Headquarters Staff and the other MEO bodies in which they have agreed to participate.

6. Command Headquarters should thereupon be formally opened on Cyprus.

IV. RECOMMENDED US POSITION FOR INITIAL SEVEN-POWER MEETING ON MEDO

1. Failing an agreement with Egypt which would make possible the establishment of MEDO Headquarters in that country, Headquarters should be established on Cyprus at the earliest practicable date with a British officer appointed as Chairman of MEDO, and SACME Designate.

2. The Authority for higher direction to SACME should be a Middle East Military Committee on which all cooperating and participating states would be represented at the Chiefs of Staff level. This body would be expected to meet infrequently. The terms of reference of the Military Committee should in general correspond to those prescribed in Annex A.

3. a. To provide specific policy guidance of a military nature to SACME, within the general guidance furnished by the Military Committee, a sub-committee of that body, organized to function continuously as executive agent, should be established simultaneously with the opening of Headquarters, MEDO. In negotiations at the Seven-Power meeting concerning the composition of such a body, the United States representatives should bear in mind the following considerations:

i. On military grounds, such a body should be held to the smallest possible size, and ideally its membership should not exceed representatives of three countries.

ii. On political grounds, it would be undesirable to exclude from such a body any of the following countries: US, UK, France, Turkey.

Obviously, there is no formula which will fully reconcile these conflicting criteria.

b. The US representatives are not instructed to work toward any specific solution of the problem of the constitution of the sub-committee of the Military Committee, other than one which takes general account of the criteria in 3a above. They should be prepared to accept, ad referendum, any such solution which receives the largest measure of support from the other representatives. In this connection, the views of the British should be given special consideration, in view of their general responsibilities in the Middle East and the primacy of their role in MEDO as evidenced by the US intention to support the designation of a British national as SACME. For the guidance of the US representatives, some alternative solutions which might be considered at the Seven-Power meeting are set forth in Annex B(1). Terms of reference of the sub-committee of the Military Committee should in general correspond to those set forth in Annex B (2).

4. The United States representatives at the four-four meeting should be prepared to accept, ad referendum, any reasonable organization of the integrated Allied Command headquarters staff which provides the United States with a position equal to that of France and Turkey and which is generally acceptable to the other sponsoring powers. It will be necessary to develop an organization which will permit efficient military operations, and at the same time will be satisfactory politically to the various sponsoring powers. The organization shown in Chart A shows a possible solution of the military and political problems involved which might be acceptable to the sponsoring powers.

5. The terms of reference of SACME should in general approximate those set forth in Annex C.

6. MEDO should be an informally constituted body consisting of a group of military liaison officers of sponsoring, participating and associated countries representing their national chiefs of staff at the Headquarters, MEDO. To carry out their liaison function, they should have access to the Chairman, MEDO and should be under the executive direction of the Chief of Staff. In addition, MEDO should be a center where the national representatives of associated nations may meet, individually or collectively as appropriate, with representatives of the sponsoring powers to present information concerning their requirements and capabilities; to seek informal advice on procedures to be followed in fulfilling their requirements; and to obtain guidance in carrying out their own training program.*

7. A reasonable apportionment of the initial total personnel requirements of MEDO might be for the United Kingdom together with the Commonwealth countries to supply about 35 per cent, Turkey, 30 per cent, the United States, 20 per cent, and France, 15 per cent. An acceptable alternative arrangement might be for the United Kingdom plus the Commonwealth to supply about 40 per cent and the United States, France and Turkey, about 20 per cent each.

8. During its initial phase, the MEDO should not have a common budget and each national contingent should pay its own personnel and provide them with logistic support in the form of supplies and equipment to be paid by the national contingent. Common supplies and services, including permanent structures, should be provided by the British.

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*In this concept, MEDO provides a common meeting ground and affords an opportunity for the national Chiefs of Staff to exchange information through their representatives at the military level. The Chiefs of Staff of associated nations will be able informally to express their concepts of the strategic defense of the Middle East as a whole to the Chiefs of Staff of participating countries; and, in like manner, receive advice and guidance in developing the capacity of each to play its proper role in resisting outside aggression.

9. Any coordination of the MEO with contiguous NATO commands should be on mutually agreed to by members of the MEO acting through the appropriate MEO body and members of the NATO acting through the NAC, after MEO has been established.

10. The coordination of naval shipping by the United States, United Kingdom and France to ensure / the Middle East area should initially be handled separately on a three-power basis. The manner in which this operation is coordinated with the defense plans of NATO should be decided by the three powers concerned later on the basis of experience.

11. While no initiative should be taken by the US representatives to effect a change in the name of the MEO, they should support any move to change the name of the organization to something like the Middle East Defense Organization which may be made by the representatives of other countries provided the British do not object.

V. OTHER POINTS CONSIDERED

The Working Group considered several further points not included in the foregoing sections. Some of these relate directly to the general position recommended in Part IV, others are not so directly related and are not from "the consideration by higher authority" in keeping with point (a) of the Working Group's term of reference. They are not matters however on which policy decisions are now required in connection with the establishment of a UK position on participation in MEDO.

1. Political Liaison with SACME

It was recognised that some arrangements for furnishing political guidance to SACME would be necessary. However, it was also recognised that the effectiveness of the Middle East Command would be greatly impaired if its political aspects were over-emphasised. It was felt that there was good cause to hope that the Command would develop friendly and cooperative relations between the military officers of the Near East states and the Western Powers, but that these favourable prospects would be impaired if Command headquarters became a gathering place for Arab politicians. This problem will require further consideration.

2. Additional United States Contributions

Appropriations exist heavily in the Middle East and the Group considered it would not be desirable to concentrate solely on the show-case part of the Middle East Command operation which will be visible to Middle Easterners. If it would contribute to the success of the Middle East Command, the possibility should not be excluded of US financial and material contributions, made in conjunction with the other sponsoring powers, beyond that recommended in Part IV, paragraph (5). However, the nature of such contributions is limited by the scope of existing authority as indicated in paragraph 4 below.

3. Legal Authority for US participation in MEDO

When the Working Group had reached a point in its discussion where it was possible to outline with some precision the probable functions and organisation of the Middle East Command and the nature of the anticipated US contribution, Counsel of the Departments of Defense and State were requested to consider the adequacy of existing authority to permit US participation as planned.

In the judgment of Counsel, adequate authority for US participation in the Command as outlined in Part II and Part IV of this report is provided by the executive powers taken in conjunction with existing legislation.

However, there is doubt as to whether authority exists which would permit a military or material contribution to the MEO which would not be used directly for the support of American personnel engaged in the enterprise. If it is considered that such a contribution would assist substantially in increasing the success of the Middle East Command, consideration should be given to the possibility of seeking additional legislative authority.

4. Consultation with Congress

The agreed result of the forthcoming Berne-power meeting will be to effect the opening of Command headquarters and the establishment of the Command as a going concern. The Working Group considers that it should point out that when the US completes arrangements with other powers to this end it will have committed itself to participation in an international military arrangement in a manner for which there is no peacetime precedent. Consideration should therefore be given to the question of consulting with the Congress before such arrangements are completed.

5. Nature and Timing of Approach to the Arab States

This is a difficult subject on which firm recommendations are not now possible. Before a final position is taken on this point, the problem should be discussed at the preliminary meeting in London and the views of the attitudes of the sponsoring powers in the several Arab states should be sought.

Those considering the problem should not lose sight of the fact that initially a major objective of MEDO will be to enlist the support of the Arab states and to open the way for cooperation on defense matters between these states and the Western powers. No significant increase in military strength to MEDO is expected to result in the foreseeable future from the accession of the Arab states, but the enlistment of their cooperation and support would produce benefits important not only politically but militarily in the event of "hot war".

Before a decision is reached as to the manner and timing of an approach to the Arab states, judgment will be required on several complex questions. The more important of these questions are listed below and a tentative position suggested on each:

g. Will the prospects of acceptance be better if the Arab states are consulted while MEDO is still in process of formulation or after it is set up and becomes a going concern? The Group's tentative opinion is that the advantages of consulting the Arab states early enough to enable them to express opinion before the organization of MEDO is definitely fixed would probably outweigh the disadvantages of such a course. A difficulty inherent in the MEDO is the fact that the organization is sponsored by the Western powers. A major effort must be made to persuade the Arab states that the MEDO is not an alien development and can be made to serve and protect their interests.

h. Will the Arab states be more likely to accept an arrangement which enables them to be associated with MEDO and to receive possible benefits without the assumption of responsibilities, or one which accords them a place equal to that of the sponsoring powers at the price of assuming certain obligations? The Group has no firm opinion on this point, but considers it important to keep the organization sufficiently flexible to permit the Arab states to become members on either basis. To the maximum extent possible it will be desirable to avoid distinct classes of membership.

i. Will the Arab states act individually or as a bloc, (possibly through the Arab League) in response to invitations to membership in the MEDO? Again it is impossible to form a definite judgment. The Group believes that it will be desirable to begin on the assumption that it will be possible to treat with the Arab states individually, but that the position should be sufficiently flexible to permit negotiations with them as a group if this course will secure the objective.

j. Will developments in the Anglo-Egyptian situation affect the position under 'a' and 'c' above? It seems entirely possible that they will, though it is impossible to predict exactly how. The recognition of this possibility reinforces the conclusion that a maximum degree of flexibility in the form of MEDO and in the scheduling of approaches to the Arab states should be retained.

So far as it is now possible to foresee developments, it appears that MEDO will be established by a series of steps roughly as follows:

a. A preliminary meeting of the seven sponsoring powers to be convened in London at an early date -- say about May 10.

b. A possible second preliminary meeting to be held a few weeks later, possibly in Cyprus or Ankara. (Whether such a meeting is convened will depend upon (i) the success of progress made at London and (ii) a judgment as to the desirability of bringing in the Arab states at a preliminary stage.)

c. A meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the sponsoring (and participating) states who would appoint SACME Designate, to be held several weeks following 'b' above (or following 'a' if 'b' is omitted.)

d. The formal opening of Command headquarters on Cyprus which should take place as quickly as possible following 'c'.

At the preliminary meeting in London the general question of approaches to the Arab states should be an early topic for discussion and agreement should be sought on a proposal to solicit opinions from the missions of the sponsoring powers in the several Arab capitals concerning the desirability of a prompt approach to the Arab states and an invitation to them to attend a possible second preliminary meeting. If it appears feasible, it might be desirable to arrange for the submission of joint appraisals by the missions of the sponsoring powers in each Arab capital while the preliminary meeting is still in session.

If a second meeting were held, to include representatives of the Arab states, the sponsoring powers should be prepared to listen to Arab views, to engage in a process of mutual accommodation and possibly to admit the Arab states as participating members if they so desire.

Even though it should be decided that it is not desirable to invite the Arab states to attend a meeting prior to the actual establishment of the MEDO, the Group considers that they should probably be informed of the results of the London conference, and the nature of the projected plans. Their views on the project should be solicited and they should be given to understand that the door to MEDO was open and would remain open to them.

The nature of further approaches to the Arab states after the establishment of the MEDO can best be considered at that time.

NOTE: The manner and timing of an approach to Israel will depend in large measure upon the approach to the Arab states.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

ANNEX A

TO

[illegible] TO ANNEX TO [illegible]

Terms of Reference for Military Committee
(Persian Gulf Sponsoring Powers Defending Islamic Heritage)

1. There shall be established a Middle East Military Committee, on which each of the sponsoring and participating states shall be represented by the responsible Chief of Staff, to consider matters concerning the implementation of the military aspects of the Paris Declaration of 30 November 1952.

2. The Committee shall:

a. Set up and provide general guidance to such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to enable more effectively to achieve the objectives of the Declaration.

b. Provide general policy guidance of a military nature to SACME, either directly or through a subsidiary body.

c. Advise governments of the sponsoring and participating states and other agencies on military matters as appropriate.

d. Recommend to the governments of sponsoring and participating states military measures for the defence of the Middle East Area.

e. Meet periodically, as appropriate, in closed session.

3. All other procedural and organizational questions shall be resolved by the governments of the Sponsoring Powers or by the Military Committee itself.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

ANNEX B (1)

Alternative Forms of Sub-Committee of Military Committee

The following are among the possible alternative solutions of the problem of the constitution of the sub-committee of the Military Committee charged with providing SACEUR policy guidance on a continuing basis. The order in which these alternatives are presented does not imply relative merit.

a. During the period before SACEUR assumes actual command functions, and unless he requests a different arrangement, SACEUR might receive any necessary policy guidance and information additional to that provided by the U.S. Military Committee from a U.S. Military Representatives Committee. This Committee would include representatives of the Chiefs of Staff included in the Military Committee, and might be located in Washington or London. The Committee might establish on an ad hoc basis such sub-committees as would facilitate the provision of guidance and information to SACEUR (See Chart 1)

b. A Steering Group composed of representatives of U.S., U.K., and France, might be established in Washington, with a Military Representatives Committee on which all sponsoring and participating states would be represented to maintain permanent liaison with the Steering Group. (See Chart 2)

c. A Steering Group composed of representatives of U.S., U.K. and Turkey, might be established in London or Washington, with a Military Representatives Committee on which all sponsoring and participating states would be represented to maintain permanent liaison with the Steering Group.

d. A Steering Group composed of representatives of the U.S., U.K., France and Turkey, might be established in Washington or London, with a Military Representatives Committee, on which all sponsoring and participating states would be represented to maintain permanent liaison with the Steering Group. (See Chart 3)

e. A Steering Group composed of representatives of U.S. and U.K. as permanent members; representatives of two of the other sponsoring nations, as temporary members, who would be rotated annually, might be established in London or Washington, with a Military Representatives Committee on which all sponsoring and participating states would be represented to maintain permanent liaison with the Steering Group.

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ANNEX B(2)

DRAFT

Terms of Reference of Sub-Committee
of Military Committee
(Source: Military Committee)

1. In order to facilitate the rapid and efficient conduct of the work of the Military Committee, there shall be set up a Sub-Committee of that body which shall be composed of one representative each of [See Annex B(1)].

2. The Sub-Committee, in accordance with general policy guidance provided by the Military Committee, shall provide such specific policy guidance and information of a military nature to SACEUR and other bodies of the NATO as is necessary for the conduct of their activities.

3. To facilitate the unified defense of the Free World, the Sub-Committee shall coordinate with the Standing Group of NATO and integrate the defense plans originated by SACEUR with the defense plans of adjacent NATO commands; and shall make recommendations thereon to the Military Committee.

4. The Sub-Committee shall recommend to the Military Committee those matters on which the Sub-Committee should be authorized to take action in the name of the Military Committee within the framework of approved policy.

5. The Sub-Committee shall be so organized as to function continuously. The permanent site of the Sub-Committee shall be in [(See Annex B(1)]

ANNEX C
DRAFT
TERMS OF REFERENCE OF SACME

(SOURCE: MILITARY COMMITTEE)

Command

1. A Supreme Allied Commander Middle East is hereby designated. His command will be established in a Supreme Headquarters. The Supreme Command shall have an integrated staff composed of appropriate officers drawn from nations participating in the MEDO. [Note: Initially SACME will have the title, Chairman of MEDO and SACME Designate]

Area

2. The area of SACME for planning purposes will be defined from time to time by competent authority. Initially, it will include Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Israel, Cyprus, the Independent Arab Kingdoms, Iran, and adjacent sea areas. The Supreme Commander is authorized to propose to the Military Committee such modifications as he may deem desirable.

Powers in War

3. In time of war, SACME will exercise the full powers of a Supreme Commander. These powers will be defined in greater detail by the Military Committee.

Powers in Peace

4. In time of peace, the Command will be a planning, coordinating and liaison organization. It should be so organized as to provide a basis for immediate expansion to a fully operational Command Organization in event of war. The Supreme Commander's peacetime responsibilities include:

a) The organization and training of national units allocated to his command into an effective fighting force.

b) The preparation of plans for the execution of his assigned missions, and their coordination with MEDO and national plans.

c) Recommendations to the Military Committee, and to National Commanders on deployment of forces, adequacy of forces, training standards, budgetary matters and such other military considerations as affect his ability to discharge his mission.

d) Proposing to the Military Committee any subordinate command or planning organization which he considers necessary.

e) The establishment of an efficient organization which will be the nucleus for expansion in war for the control of battle for the defense of the Middle East.

5. To execute the peacetime functions detailed above, the Supreme Commander will have direct access to the National Chiefs of Staff.

6. The responsibility for logistic support to national component forces will, in general, remain with the responsible authorities of the nations concerned. The responsibility for coordination will, however, rest with the Supreme Commander.

7. It is recognised that the Supreme Commander may delegate to his major subordinate commanders such authority as is necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities.

8. The Supreme Commander is empowered to propose to the Military Committee such modification of these terms of reference as he may deem desirable.

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ANNEX 3

The documentation supporting Part II facts and assumptions is presented below. The lettering corresponds to that in the body of the text.

1. Early British Command of a Middle East Command

a. "The United States Government attaches great importance to the establishment of the MEC and we hope that it will be possible to establish it formally about March or April 1942 ... I think representatives of the sponsoring powers and the Commonwealth nations should hold meetings in Washington in the near future." -- Negotiating paper for Truman-Churchill Talks approved at the official level January 6, 1942 (ABC-4/22).

"We think it essential for the advance of our common cause that an Allied Middle East Command should be set up as soon as possible". -- Joint Communique on Truman-Churchill Talks of January 7-8, issued January 9, 1942.

b. "Since it seems unlikely that the headquarters of such an organization can be in Egypt under present conditions, the United Kingdom is prepared to offer Cyprus for the purpose" -- United Kingdom memorandum on MEC handed Department of State January 29, 1942, and subsequently presented France and Turkey.

"This Department considers it would be desirable from a political point of view that there be established on Cyprus ... a Middle East Command headquarters". -- Letter from Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense, December 27, 1941.

2. General Character of MEC

a. "The Middle East Command is important to the achievement of our political objectives in the Middle East and delay in its establishment will further prejudice the Western political position in that area." -- Discussion section, Negotiating paper for Truman-Churchill Talks approved at the official level January 6, 1942 (ABC-4/22).

"The United States interest in the MEC is two-fold. First, that its establishment will further the political objectives of the sponsoring powers, and secondly, that its structure be such that ultimate coordination with any contiguous Allied Commands can be effected in a manner politically and militarily accepted to USA". -- Memorandum by WPD on ABC-4/22, December 28, 1941, Paragraph 4.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

b. "The United States is basically opposed to establishing any formal political association between the countries participating in the Allied Middle East Command." -- Position paper recommended by Defense, September 11, 1951, and concurred in by State as basis for developing Allied Command in the Middle East.

c. "The task of the MEC at the outset will be primarily one of planning and providing the Middle East States on their request with assistance in the form of advice and training."-- 4-Power Declaration, November 10, 1951.

"The first stage of the Command should be as a planning, coordinating and liaison organization only, rather on the lines of the early Western Union organization at Fontainebleau". -- United Kingdom memorandum on Allied Middle East Command handed to Department, January 21, 1952 Paragraph 7.

"There should be no forces placed under the Command until the Organization has taken shape and the present unsettled situation in the Middle East is resolved or greatly improved." Ibid., Paragraph 9.

"The United States is in general agreement with British ideas regarding the importance of coordinated planning for the establishment of the MEC, which initially might not be a fully operational Command." -- Department's comments on the British memorandum of January 29, handed officers of the British Embassy February 7, 1952.

d. "While details have yet to be formulated, the sponsoring States intend that the MEC should be an integrated Allied Command, not a National Command. The responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East will be to ensure the effectiveness of the corporate defense enterprise represented by the Command. All States joining in this enterprise will be individually associated with the Command on the basis of equality through a Middle East Defense Liaison Organization which will be located at Middle East Command Headquarters and will be the link between the Command and the countries ready to join in the defense of this area." -- 4-Power Declaration, November 10, 1951.

e. "Whereas the signatory powers of the North Atlantic Treaty are naturally interested in the relations which may exist between their organization and a Middle East Command when it will be established.

The North Atlantic Council decides as follows: - Any coordination of a Middle East Command which may be established outside the NAT Area with contiguous NATO Commands will be agreed by the Council after such a Middle East Command is established and its nature known." —North Resolution on Relationship between NATO and a Middle East Command, agreed to at meeting of U. K., France, [illegible] 27, 1951, at which U.S. represented by Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of JCS.

f. "Without prejudice to the question of the permanent location of the Committee, the Committee will be located initially in Washington. It is anticipated that close coordination will be essential between the operations of the Committee and the defense plans of SHAPE. For this reason, the location of the Committee will be reconsidered upon the establishment of the Middle East Command." —Terms of Reference for Near East Arms Coordination Committee tentatively agreed by U. S., U.K. and France.

3. Egypt

a. "The aim should be to set up a uniform Middle East Command organization . . ." [illegible] memo to the Department January 21, 1952.

4. Membership in MEDO

a. "It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East Command in which the countries able and willing to contribute to the defense of the area should participate. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are prepared to participate with other interested countries in establishing such a Command. Invitations to participate in the Command have been addressed to Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, who have indicated their interest in the defense of the area and who have agreed in principle." — Proposals presented to the Egyptian Government on October 13, 1951 by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey.

b. " . . . these sponsoring states intend . . ." —Four-Power Declaration, November 10, 1951.

"The UK proposes that there should be a meeting of the Four powers announced in the Declaration, and the interested Commonwealth countries Australia, New Zealand and South Africa." —United Kingdom Memorandum handed to the Department, January 21, 1952.

"All States joining in this enterprise will be individually associated with the Command through a Middle East Defense Liaison Organization." -- Four Power Declaration, December 10, 1951. Paragraph 7.

5. National Contributions

a. "We cannot ourselves consider at this time any further extension of military commitments in the Middle East and our participation does not involve a commitment of troops. The United States participation will be limited to participation in the integrated command staff and to the provision of some military aid". TCF-D4/28.

6. Nature of the Command

a. "The United States is mindful that the Middle East is an area of long standing importance to the United Kingdom" -- Comments of Joint Chiefs of Staff on TCF D-4/28.

"Has at this stage should the Head of the Organization be called a Supreme Commander, but something on the lines of Chairman of MEDO and Supreme Commander Designate" -- UK Memorandum on MEDO, handed Department of January 22, para. 9.

b. "With regard to the area of the Middle East Command we expect it to include the Arab States, Israel, the independent Arab Sheikdoms and Iran." -- TCF-D4/28.

c. "The MEDO should, nevertheless, be called and be organized as a Command Headquarters, since should war occur before MEDO had progressed beyond this embryo stage it would provide an immediate basis for expansion to a Supreme Command Organization." -- United Kingdom Memorandum, January 21, 1952, Paragraph 7.

7. The Liaison Organization

a. See 2 g. above.

b. "Requests for arms and equipment made by States in the area willing to join in the defense by sponsoring states in a position to assist in this connection will be filled by them to the extent possible following the coordination of such requests through the MEC." -- Four Power Declaration, December 10, 1951.

HIGHER DIRECTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA

Chart-I


GOVERNMENTS
M.E. MILITARY COMMITTEE (1)
CHIEFS OF STAFF PARTICIPATING NATIONS
M.E. MILITARY, REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE (2)
PARTICIPATING NATIONS
CHAIRMAN OF M.E.C.O. AND SUPREME COMDR. DESIG. (3)(4)
M.E. DEFENSE LIAISON ORGANIZATION (5)
ASSOCIATED AND PARTICIPATING NATIONS

(1) MEETS PERIODICALLY AS APPROPRIATE.

(2) PERMANENT LOCATION IN LONDON OR WASHINGTON.

(3) AREA INCLUDES EGYPT, LEVANT STATES, IRAQ, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND TRIBAL SHEIKDOMS.

(4) EXERCISES SUPREME COMMAND OVER MILITARY AFFAIRS OF AREA.

(5) MILITARY LIAISON OFFICERS REPRESENTING NATIONAL CHIERS OF STAFF AT HEADQUARTERS, M.E.C.O.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

HIGHER DIRECTION OF THE M.E.C.O.

Chart-2


Ggovernments
M.E. MILITARY COMMITTEE (1)
Chiefs of Staff Participating Nations
M.E. STEERING GROUP (U.S.-U.K.-FR.) (2)
M.E. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE (2)
Turkey-Commonwealth M.E. Nations Participating
CHAIRMAN OF M.E.C.O. AND SUPREME COMDR, DESIG. (3)(4) (U.K.)
M.E. DEFENSE LIAISON ORGANIZATION (5)
Associated and Participating Nations

(1) Meets periodically as appropriate.
(2) Permanent location in Washington.
(3) Area includes Egypt, Levant States, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Trucial Sheikdoms.
(4) Exercises Supreme Command over Military Affairs of Area.
(5) Military Liaison Officers Representing National Chiefs of Staff at Headquarters, M.E.C.O.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

JCS/PS 28 FEB '52

HIGHER DIRECTION OF THE M.E.C.O.

Chart-3


GOVERNMENTS
M.E. MILITARY COMMITTEE (1)
Chiefs of Staff Participating Nations
M.E. STEERING GROUP (U.S.-U.K.-FR.-T.) (2)
M.E. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE (2)
Turkey-Commonwealth M.E. Nations Participating
CHAIRMAN OF M.E.C.O. AND SUPREME COMDR, DESIG. (3)(4) (U.K.)
M.E. DEFENSE LIAISON ORGANIZATION (5)
Associated and Participating Nations

(1) Meets periodically as appropriate.
(2) Permanent location in London or Washington.
(3) Area includes Egypt, Levant States, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Trucial Sheikdoms.
(4) Exercises Supreme Command over Military Affairs of Area.
(5) Military Liaison Officers Representing National Chiefs of Staff at Headquarters, M.E.C.O.

STAFF ORGANIZATION, HEADQUARTERS, MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

Chart-4



LEGEND

****	Four Star Rank
***	Three Star Rank
**	Two Star Rank
COL.	Colonel or equivalent Rank

"Deps. C/S to be selected from appropriate service of sponsoring powers."

JCS/PS 27 FEB '52